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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CREATIVE ARTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
By LEON R. Y-ANcwicH*
Introduction
Law, whatever its form, arises out of human needs. Before law finds
expression in legislative enactment or judicial decisions, human relations
must exist to which legal norms can apply. Except where, through conquest
and colonization, a legal system is imposed upon a community from the
outside, all law, ultimately, stems from communal needs which the legislator and jurist have formalized. 1
The variety of those needs derives from the diversity of activities.
In the United States, they account for the fact that, despite the uniform
basis of our civilization, the different development of the states and regions
have resulted in distinct systems of jurisprudence and, in many instances, in
a difference in emphasis on principles within the common law pattern.
Even in the application of principles of general nature and of ideas or legal
norms embodied in federal legislation, the incidence of certain economic
and social activities in certain parts of the United States have led to the
development of a jurisprudence that is strictly localized. Because the publishing of books and works of literature, art and science, has been, and, to a
great extent, still is, confined to the Eastern Coast, and the original publication and production of dramatic works, in the past, has been confined to the
State of New York, the exposition of the legal principles relating to proprietorship in ideas, whether stemming from common law principles or
the law of copyright, was restricted to the courts of that state and of the
Eastern Coast. With the artistic development of the West, and, especially,
with the advent, first of the motion picture, then of the talking picture, and
later, of television and kindred arts, and their unfoldment on the Pacific
Coast, the courts of that area began to be called upon more and more to
determine problems in the realm of proprietorship of ideas, copyright and
contractual rights pertaining to the relationship arising out of theatrical
and motion picture production which, in the past, had been the sole
appanage of the Eastern Coast. So it is the object of this study to show
how the courts in the Western States comprising the Ninth Circuit (Arizona,
California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington), both federal
and state, have applied the law of literary property and other legal principles relating to literature, drama and art as the West "has grown up."'
*

Chief U. S. District Judge, Southern District of California.

MAx WEBER, LAW IN EcoNomy AND SocIEmTY 65 et seq., (1954); Yankwich, The Scholar and
the Law, 46 THE BRIEF, PHI DELTA PHI QUARTERLY 193 (1951).
2In this respect the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 (1934) defines law as "... the
body of principles, standards and rules which the courts of a particular state apply in the decision
of controversies brought before them."
(123)
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I.

The Law of Literary Property
The common law recognized a property right in the products of man's
creative mind regardless of the form in which they took expression. For
this reason and without regard to copyright, literary property is given the
same recognition as other personal property. An author will be protected in
the right to his manuscript until he permits general publication.
The Western States in which the problem has arisen recognize this
property right.3 A late California case has stated its nature very succinctly:
"A product of the mind is property. . . . It is an intangible incorporeal
right." 4 Other California cases, preceding and following it, have reasserted
this principle,' which has also been recognized by Washington courts.'
The Washington case just referred to shows the extent to which the courts
will go in protecting property rights to the original expression of ideas.
For in it, the phrase "The Beer of The Century," which had been suggested
by the plaintiffs, was given protection.'
Generally, the courts extend the protection not to ideas, but to the
concrete forms in which they are embodied.' Whatever deviation there may
have been from this principle in some California cases,9 the latest California
cases10 have restored the law so that it accords with the general law on the
subject.1 1
' CALIF. Crv. CODE §§ 654, 655, 980. With commendable consistency the California courts have
recognized the right to an unpublished work and sustained bequests of identifiable unpublished
manuscripts. See, Estate of White, 84 Cal.App.2d 409, 190 P.2d 968 (1948). In the particular case,
the transfer proved illusory because, although in an action before me, I held that there had been
only a limited publication of the manuscript [White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950) 1,
the Court of Appeals disagreed with the conclusion and held that the publication was general, and,
therefore, in the public domain. White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952). See, Schlacthman, The Doctrine of Limited Publication, 5th Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP), 1954, p. 57.
'Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal.App.2d 796, 808, 187 P.2d 474, 482
(1947).
' Burtis v. Universal Pictures, 40 Cal.2d 823, 256 P.2d 933 (1953) ; Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal.2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953) ; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d
947 (1953) ; Loew's, Incorporated v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 419, 115 P.2d 983 (1941) ; Yadkoe
v. Fields, 66 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 P.2d 906 (1944) ; Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45 CaL
App.2d 464, 114 P.2d 370 (1941) ; Richardson v. Hislop, 109 Cal.App. 440, 293 Pac. 168 (1930).
'Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P.2d 1053 (1936), cited
with approval in Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., supra note 4 at 814, 187 P.2d
at 485.
' This contrasts with the attitude of one of the California courts which, while enunciating the
principle that a scenario is what the law designates as "an intellectual product," observed rather
sarcastically that "in some instances this may be a misnomer." Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
45 Cal.App.2d 464, 466, 114 P.2d 370, 372 (1941).
'Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., supra note 4; Barsha v.Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
32 CaLApp.2d 556, 90 P.2d 371 (1939).
Golding v. R.K.O., 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950) ; Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
1" CALIF. CiV. CODE § 980(a), as amended in 1947; Burtis v. Universal Pictures, 40 Cal.2d 823,
256 P.2d 933 (1953); Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal.2d 799, 256 P.2d 962
(1953) ; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953).
" See, Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457 (1951);
Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 So. CAL. L. REV. 120 (1954) ; Note, Literary Property, 38 CAL. L.
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Procedural methods need not detain us. It suffices to say that when there
is unauthorized use, the courts allow recovery upon the theory of an implied
agreement to compensate for the use or damage from unauthorized use.
And the protection will extend to expressions showing very little originality,
so long as there is some originality in the combination of ideas, or in their
concrete embodiment."2
And so, in determining the existence or non-existence of similarity from
which an inference of plagiarism can be drawn, the courts apply the
commonly accepted test of impression by the average reader or viewer and
forbid the substitution of the judgment of the expert analyst. The trier of
facts is thus permitted to draw inferences of plagiarism from the similarity
of the materials arising from details, sequence of events, manner of
expression, and treatment.'" Moreover, where the material is of a character
as to which no proprietary right could be exercised, such as the title to a
work, the courts will, nevertheless, forbid its use by another as unfair
competition. This is illustrated by the case in which the originators of a
method of supplying credit information were protected against competitors.'
And the Supreme Court of California has sustained an award of
$17,500 for use of the title of a play which, although produced, had proved
unsuccessful. Conceding that the author of a play has no "inherent right
in the title to his production," the court, nevertheless, held that through the
advertising which preceded and followed the staging of the play, the title
had acquired a secondary meaning and had attained "a protective status."'"
The Western courts have also recognized a person's right "to himself"--the
right of privacy-the right "to be let alone."'"
REV. 332 (1950) ; Note, Common Law Copyright, 24 So. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1950) ; Note, Literary
Property in Ideas, 20 So. CAL. L. REV. 371 (1947). And see, Webster, Protecting Things ValuableIdeas, 5th Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP), 1954, p. 158; Young, Plagiarism,Piracy and the
Common
Law Copyright, 5th Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP), 1954, p. 205.
12
Borden &Barton v. Warner Bros., 99 CalApp.2d 760, 222 P.2d 463 (1950).
"3 Burtis v. Universal Pictures, 40 Cal.2d 823, 256 P.2d 933 (1953) ; Barsha v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, 32 CaLApp.2d 556, 90 P.2d 371 (1939). This accords with the federal rule to the effect
that originality is a question of fact and not of law. Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 99 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1938). Under a 1947 statute (CALI. CODE OF CIv. PRo. § 426 (3)),
a plaintiff in an action for plagiarism is required to attach a copy of the original and of the pirated
production, and the court may order a view in passing on the sufficiency of the complaint. This has
enabled California state courts to determine absence of similarity without a trial. See, Palmer v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 119 Cal.App.2d 456, 259 P.2d 741 (1953) ; Sutton v. Walt Disney Productions, 118 Cal.App.2d 598, 248 P.2d 599 (1953).
" McCord v. Plotnick, 108 Cal.App.2d 392, 239 P.2d 32 (1951).
"Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, 36 Cal.2d 116, 121, 222 P.2d 433, 436 (1950).
California courts have prohibited as unfair competition the imitation of the established characterization of an actor; Chaplin v. Amador, 93 CalApp. 358, 269 Pac. 544 (1928) ("little tramp"
identified with Charles Chaplin); Jones v. Republic Productions, 112 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1940)
(the "Lone Ranger" and his horse "Silver"); and the use of a business name similar to one
associated with a group organized to advance the motion picture arts; Academy of Motion Picture
Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal.2d 684, 104 P.2d 650 (1940).
" Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) ; Reed v. Real Detective Publ.
Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P.2d 441
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But what is more important, in view of the expansion of the media of
communication through radio, motion pictures and television, is that the
courts have held that the right of privacy is not absolute, but is limited to
persons who are not public figures. As to persons who are in the public eye
or matters which are of public concern, the invasion of privacy through
publication of photographs or other non-defamatory matter is permitted.'"
One of the late California cases on the subject has summed up the two
facets of this problem in this manner:
"The so-called independent right of privacy which is recognized in this
state is not an absolute right 'to be let alone' and to live one's life in utter
privacy freed at all times from the prying eyes of the public or of a public
recountal of the facts thereof. The right of the individual to privacy of his
'private' life is a limited right in that it is always subject to the right of the
public to a disclosure thereof where there is a proper warranted public
interest as to the facts of his life. The dividing line between the individual
right and the so-called public right is not easily drawn and must be determined in every instance by the facts of each case. The general test, in
large measure, is whether the public interest in obtaining or having disclosed
to it the information outweighs
the protection of the individual's personal
8
interest and desires."'

The courts, in this respect, have followed the trend observable elsewhere
of striking an equitable balance between individual rights and public needs,
thus illustrating once more the capacity for adaptation of our legal system.' 9

H.

The Obedience of the Artist
The development of the motion picture and kindred arts and the
concentration of their activities on the Pacific Coast have affected the
contractual relations between the persons engaged in those activities. The
special nature of the services of a motion picture artist led to the incorporation into the California law in 1919 of the provision allowing the issuance
of injunctions to prevent the breach of a contract:
"... where the promised service is of a special, unique, unusual,
extraordinary or intellectual character which gives it peculiar value the loss of
which cannot be20 reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an
action at law."
(1953) ; Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal.2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) ; Kirby v. Hal Roach Studios,
53 Cal.App.2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.App.2d 304,
95 P.2d 491 (1939) ; Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal.App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) ; Hinish v. Meyer &
Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) ; Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691,
117 Pac. 594 (1911). See, Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NoTRE DAME LAw. 499 (1952).
" Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Coverstone v. Davies,
38 Cal.2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952); Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal.App.2d 191,
238 P.2d 670 (1951) ; Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal.App.2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949).
" Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., supra note 17 at 194, 238 P.2d at 671.
19 In the early days of talking pictures, it was determined that a writer who sold the "motion
picture, dramatic and spoken stage rights" of his novels had conveyed the right to produce talking
pictures. Rosenberg & Lesser v. Wright, Copyright Office Bulletin No. 20, p. 599 (1934). See,
Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 112 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940).
'0 CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PRO.

§ 526(5).
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This is a deviation from the general equitable rule embodied in the
same section that no injunction will issue to prevent the breach of a contract
for personal services. 2 ' As if to protect motion picture companies from
temperamental juvenile stars, the California legislature, in 1927, amended
the provision allowing disaffirmance of contracts by minors by including in
the list of contracts not disaflrmable:
A contract or agreement employing such person as, or wherein such
person agrees to perform or render services as, an actor, actress, or other
dramatic performer, or as a participant or player in professional sports,
including, but without being limited to, professional boxers, professional
wrestlers and professional jockeys, where such contract or agreement has been
approved by the superior court in the county in which such minor resides or
is employed. 22 ,
The Supreme Court of California has extended this provision not only
to the contract entered into through the court, but to the options under it.

And it could see no constitutional objection to limiting the right to minors
engaged in certain professions only, saying:
"It can hardly be questioned that there are reasonable grounds for the
statutory provisions withdrawing the right of disaffirmance from minors with
regard to contracts to render services in the professions specified in section
36, if such contracts are found reasonable by a court in a special proceeding
for the examination thereof. Whether certain other groups of minors engaged
in professions similar to those specified in section 36 should be included
in the section is a matter of legislative diser~tion. New legislation such as this
ordinarily first covers the fields where it is most urgently needed, and may
be extended in the light of experience. . . The statute therefore does not
violate constitutional rights of the defendant under the equal protection of
laws clause of the United States Constitution or under the provisions of the
California Constitution against special legislation. '23

Aside from legislative enactments, the courts in applying the law of
master and servant have had to take into consideration the peculiar nature
of the motion picture art and the temperament of the persons engaged in it.
In a California case the court was called upon to determine whether a motion
picture company was justified in discharging an actress, under contract, for
failing to report for work at a definite hour set by the studio. Although
the matter was not specifically covered by the written contract, the court
held that the order to report was a reasonable one, of the type that the
acress was bound to obey, under penalty of discharge, saying:
"Any 'willful' disobedience of an order that is reasonable and not
inconsistent with the contract of employment is sufficient to justify the
21Csiur. Crv. CODE §3423; Poultry Producers v. Barlow, 189 Ca]. 278, 208 Pac. 93 (1922).
Elsewhere, contracts for personal services are limited to seven years: CALir. LABOR CODE § 2855;
De Haviland
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 67 Cal.App.2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944).
2
CAL F. CM. CODE § 36(2).
"Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal.2d 766, 777, 192 P.2d 949 (1948).
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servant's discharge. (Civ. Code, Sec. 2000) 'Willful' disobedience of a
specific, peremptory instruction of the master, if the instruction be reasonable
and consistent with the contract, is a breach of duty-a breach of the contract
of service; and, like any other breach of the contract, of itself entitles the
master to renounce the contract of employment. According to the decided
preponderance of authority, a single act of disobedience to a specific, reasonable order from the master to the servant is, as a matter of law, a violation
of duty that justifies the master in discharging; . . . and whether actual
injury has resulted to the master's business is wholly beside the mark...
The motive of the master in giving the order is not important. Whether the
order is reasonable is the important question. The master has the right to
make a reasonable order though he knows it will be distasteful to the
servant, and even though he gives the order with24 the expectation that the
servant will leave his employ rather than obey."
But in a later case, 25 which arose in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles while I was on the bench, the ruling was modified. I was called
upon to determine whether "arguing" with directors as to the manner in
which scenes should be acted was the type of disobedience for which an
actress could be discharged, after performance by her had been accepted.
The person involved was Jetta Goudal, a motion picture actress of the silent
screen who was discharged by her employer for several alleged acts of
disobedience: (1) absences; (2) failure to perform when requested; (3) as
requested; or (4) conscientiously or to the best of her ability; or (5) as
exclusively directed by defendant, and in accordance with its ideas and
instructions; and (6) delay of production through tardiness.
In sum, the disobedience charged consisted chiefly of arguments with
directors about the manner of acting certain scenes, refusal to act as
directed, and tardiness. The contract of employment provided:
"The Artist . . . shall perform her said services at all times and places,
during the day and night, and in the manner required or directed by the
producer, either in the state of California or elsewhere, and under and in
accordance with the exclusive direction, control and ideas and instruction
of the Producer, through its officers, agent or agents, and shall render said
services conscientiously, artistically and to the utmost of her ability."
While this clause subjected the artist to the direction of the employer,
I considered the added clause that the work performed be artistically done,
", May v. New York Motion Picture Corp., 45 Cal.App. 396, 403, 187 Pac. 785, 788 (1920).
Similarly, the refusal of a director to report on two consecutive days in violation of a studio rule
was held to be ground for discharge: Bank of America v. Republic Productions, 44 Cal.App.2d 651,
112 P.2d 972 (1941). However, where an actress held herself in readiness for work but was not
called, she was allowed to recover the "minimum compensation" guaranteed, deducting from it
amounts earned by other work; De las Falaise v. Gaumont-British Pictures Corp., 39 Cal.App.2d
461, 103 P.2d 447 (1940) ; Payne v. Pathe Studios, 6 Cal.App.2d 136, 44 P.2d 598 (1935). Where
the meaning of "minimum compensation" is uncertain, parol evidence as to its meaning should
be admitted: R.K.O. Pictures v. Sheridan, 195 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1952).
2 Goudal v. DeMille Picture Corp., (Calif. Superior Court) Los Angeles Journal, Mar. 19, 20,
1929.
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as indicating that, in determining what is or is not disobedience, the general
nature of the employment to which the contract relates, and the capabilities
which the actress was known to possess, and with regard to which the contract
was made, had to be taken into consideration. The very preamble to the
contract was an acknowledgement of this fact:
"The Artist, for several years immediately last past, has been engaged
as an actress in the production of motion pictures, and is possessed of, and
represents that, the services to be performed by her, hereunder, are of a
special, unique, unusual, extraordinary, and intellectual character, which

gives them peculiar value." (Emphasis added.)
In an employment of this character, obedience of the type stressed in
Alfred Lord Tennyson's The Charge of the Light Brigade,
"Theirs not to make reply
Theirs not to reason why
Theirs but to do . . ."
is not required. So, in considering whether there was wilful disobedience,
the nature of the orders given as well as the effect of refusal to obey must
be taken into consideration. Admittedly, a contract of employment implies
an obligation on the part of the servant to obey, substantially, the lawful
and reasonable commands of his master.2" A refusal to obey which, in
view of all the circumstances of the case, amounts to insubordination, and
is inconsistent with the servant's duties to his master, is a valid ground for
discharge.2 7 Given the great variety of employments, what, in a specific
instance, amounts to insubordination (or "wilful breach of duty," as it was
called in section 2000 of the California Civil Code, now section 2924 of the
California Labor Code), is dependent upon the nature of the employment,
the position of the servant, and the nature of the command. From one
occupying a supervisory capacity or an employment requiring the exercise
of great proficiency, the law does not demand or expect the slavish obedience
of an unskilled workman.28 Nor can a highly skillful employee be required
to perform services of an inferior or less important character.2 9
In view of the special nature of theatrical services, and the high
Civ. CODE § 1981 (now tALWF. LABon CODE § 2856).
"39 CoRPus JtR., Master and Servant § 86 (now 56 CJ.S. § 42(h) at 432-33); Adams v.
"CALIF.

Southern Pacific Co., 204 Cal. 63, 266 Pac. 541 (1929). For later cases, see, Seagram & Sons v.
Bynum, 191 F.2d 5, 17, 18 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Albrecht v. N.L.R.B., 181 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1950) ;
Keserich v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 163 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1947); Compania Constructora
Bechtel-McCone v. McDonald, 157 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Steinmetz v. Calif. State Board of
Education, 44 Ca2d 816, 285 P.2d 617 (1955).
" Carpenter Steel Co. v. Norcross, 204 Fed. 537 (6th Cir. 1913) ; Park Bros. & Co. v. Bushnell,
60 Fed. 583 (2d Cir. 1894) ; Crabtree v. Bay State Felt Co., 227 Mass. 68, 116 N.E. 535 (1917);
Shaver v. Ingham, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N.W. 162 (1886).
"Development Co. v. King, 161 Fed. 91 (2d Cir. 1908) ; Marx v. Miller, 134 Ala. 347, 32 So.
765 (1902); Davis v. Dodge, 126 App.Div. 469, 110 N.Y.S. 787 (1908) ; Loos v. Walter Brewing
Co., 145 Wis. 1, 129 N.W. 645 (1911); Price v. Mouat, 11 C.B. (N.S.) 508, 142 Eng. Rep. 895
(1862).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

degree of expertness involved in their performance, as well as the baneful
consequences flowing from services inferior to the established reputation of
the artist,
these principles have been given full recognition in theatrical
30
cases.
To such an employment, the words of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts apply:
"Not every trivial breach of duty will warrant puting an end to the
contract before the appointed time."3 1
Similar declarations have been made by other courts:
"A rule which might be perfectly applicable to the precision with which
a coachman or gardener should be required to obey the direction of his master
or mistress in regard to details of the service which involved the comfort of
the household, might be inapplicable to the case of exact compliance by a
manager of a large factory with a general rule which required him to render
' 32
daily memoranda of his business life for the inspection of the directors."
"Willful disobedience, in the sense in which the word is used by the
authorities, means something more than a conscious .failure to obey.
(Emphasis added.) It involves a wrongful or perverse disposition, such as to
render the conduct unreasonable, and inconsistent with proper subordination.
We are not prepared to hold that, even in what is known as menial service,
every act of disobedience may be lawfully punishable by the penalty of
dismissal and the serious consequence it entails upon the servant put out
of place ...
"In such employments as involve a higher order of service, and
some degree of discretion and judgment, it would in our opinion be
unauthorized and unreasonable to regard skilled mechanics and other employes, as subject to the whim and caprice of their employers or as deprived
of all right of action to such a degree as to be liable to lose their places
'33
upon every omission to obey orders, involving no serious consequences."
This is especially true where the nature of the employment is such
that the employee's "...
reputation and his future good name and value
(are) dependent upon his success. . . .
(Emphasis added.) The obedience

of an artist is, thus, not that of a menial.3 5
On the basis of the facts and legal principles outlined, I reached the
conclusion that there was no breach of contract by the artist and that her
continued employment, and moreover, acceptance of performance, after
3 Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Lerche, 267 Fed. 353, 359 (9th Cir. 1920) ; Baron v. Placide,
7 La. Ann. 229 (1852) ; Kelly v. Caldwell, 4 La. Rep. (O.S.) 38 (1832) ; Warner v. Rector of Holy
Church, 1 City Court Rep. 419 (N.Y. 1881) ; Roserie v. Kiralfy Bros., 12 Phila. Rep. 209 (Penn.
1877). 1 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT 879 (2d ed. 1913).
"Crabtree v. Bay State Felt Co., 227 Mass. 68, 116 N.E. 535 (1917).
'2 Park Bros. & Co. v. Bushnell, 60 Fed. 583 (2d Cir. 1894).
'8 Shaver v. Ingham, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N.W. 162 (1886).
8, Cook v. Stabb, 1884-1896 Newfoundland Law
Reports 240, 242.
" Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Lerche, 267 Fed. 353 (9th Cir. 1920). It was held there that a
rejection of a comedy part, by an actress who had no experience in comedies, was "a reasonable
objection on her part, whether considered as a protest or a refusal to play, and did not constitute
a breach of contract on her part."
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the alleged disagreements and arguments with the director constituted a
waiver of any right to discharge. In the opinion of the California District
Court of Appeals sustaining the judgment, emphasis is placed upon the fact
that in the realm of artistic endeavor, a special type of obedience is
required:
"Even in the most menial forms of employment there will exist circumstances justifying the servant in questioning the order of the master....
And when the employment is of the services of 'a special, unique, unusual,
extraordinary and intellectual character,' as is agreed by the contract here
under consideration, to be rendered 'conscientiously, artistically and to the
utmost of her ability' sincere efforts of the artist to secure an artistic interpretation of the play, even though they may involve the suggestion of changes
and the presentation of argument in favor of such changes, even though
insistently presented, do not amount to wilful disobedience or failure to
perform services under the contract, but rather a compliance with the contract
which basically calls for services in the best interest of the employer." 36

The Supreme Court of California, in denying a hearing, stated:
". .. A perusal of the evidence discloses that in no instance was any
final order of the employer disobeyed by the plaintiff and it cannot therefore
be said that the conclusion of the District Court of Appeals that the findings
are supported by the evidence is erroneous. It should be stated, however, that
we do not wish it to be understood as approving any declaration in the
opinion unnecessary to or inconsistent with this one ground of affirmance."s'r
Granted that an artist cannot wilfully refuse to do what a
calls for, these decisions use a realistic standard by applying to
of disobedience the test of reasonableness, consistent with the
employment. In sum, if the matter as to which disobedience existed

contract
the acts
type of
was one

which might affect the artistic integrity of the artist, a test of absolute obedience to the will of the employer should not be applied.

1M.

The Law of Copyright
The publication, exhibition and representation of literary, artistic and

dramatic works bring into play law federal in nature. So the greater development of these artistic endeavors in the West has had an impact on the

development of the law on the subject. Ordinarily it is difficult, in dealing
with a federal problem, to segmentize it and to show what federal courts
in a particular region have done. However, it is a fascinating problem to
see what contribution courts in a particular area have made to a subject

and to equate it with general federal law. So the manner in which federal
" Goudal v. DeMille Picture Corp., 118 CalApp. 407,413,414, 5 P.2d 432,435 (1931).
""118 CaLApp. 415, 7 P.2d 174 (1932). As the statement of the Court of Appeals which is
cited in the test is part of the legal basis for sustaining the finding that the artist did not disobey,
I do not believe that the Supreme Court disavowed the statement. If they did, I still consider it
sound law.
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courts in the Ninth Circuit have approached and solved some of these
problems is now considered.
A.

The Nature of Copyright Protection.

In dealing with this problem chief attention must be paid to the law
of copyright enacted under the constitutional authorization of the Congress
to enact legislation:
"(t) o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective

Writings. .... ,,38
The protection of "writings," after publication, is in addition to the
proprietary right of the author in his manuscript, recognized at common
law, 9 which is retained by the copyright law,4" and which has already been
discussed. Copyright confers the right of printing, multiplying or copying
of original literary and artistic works and selling them to the exclusion of
others.4 It is a monopoly "to prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted work."4 2
The most recent revision of the American Copyright Act,4" while
recognizing this essential feature of copyright,44 has named specifically
some of the rights implicit in the copyright grant, such as translation,"
reading in public,4" presentation of dramatic work4 7 and performance of a
musical composition." This codification has removed the doubts existing as
to some of these matters. They do not concern us here except that their
statement is necessary background for the discussion to follow.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 34649 (1908) ; Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1954).
' 17 U.S.C. § 2.
"I Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ; American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S.
284, 290-91; Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1922);
Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15, 19 (9th Cir. 1906).
42 R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940).
We are not concerned in
this study with the manner in which the courts have passed on questions relating to compliance
with various requirements of the Copyright Act. It should be stated, however, that they have been
rather liberal in interpreting the requirements as to notice. Indicative of this liberal attitude is
the ruling that the sale of phonograph records of a musical composition did not terminate its
copyright protection, Yacoubian v. Carroll, 74 U.S.P.Q. 275 (1947), and the fact that state courts
have applied a long limitation period (two years) to plagiarism actions. Italiani v. Metro-GoldwynMayer Corp., 45 Cal.App.2d 464, 114 P.2d 370 (1941). For examples of attempts to control copyright by state law, see WASH. REV. CODE C. 19.24 (1951) ; MONTANA LAWS c. 90 (1937). For an
example of the strict compliance with some of these statutes, insisted on by state courts, see Taylor
v. State of Washington, 29 Wash.2d 638, 188 P.2d 671 (1948) ; Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95
(1939) ; De Marines, State Regulation of Musical Copyrights, 6th Copyright Law Symposium
(ASCAP), 1955, p. 118.
4261 Stats. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 1.
"17 U.S.C. § 1 (a).
,217 U.S.C. § l(b).
46 17 U.S.C. § 1 (c).
"17 U.S.C. § 1 (d).
'817 U.S.C. § 1(e).
"

" Bobbs-Merrill
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Origiiality in the law of copyright "...
refers to the form of expression and not to the novelty of the subject matter."4' 9 The courts in the Ninth
Circuit have applied with great acumen the principle which protects the
original expression of ideas. Some leading cases decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will serve to illustrate both the positive and
negative application of the principle.
The Harold Lloyd Corporation had copyrighted the photoplay "Movie
Crazy" starring Harold Lloyd. Lloyd employed Clyde Bruckman to assist
as a writer and director during the production of the play. Some ten years
later, Universal Pictures Co., Inc. produced a motion picture entitled "So's
Your Uncle" and employed Bruckman as writer for that production. Plaintiff Lloyd brought an action against defendants Universal and Bruckman
alleging infringement upon the copyright by virtue of incorporating into
"So's Your Uncle" fifty-seven consecutive scenes from "Movie Crazy"
known as the "Magician's Coat Sequence." On appeal from the judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, the court was called upon to determine several
questions, the most important of which was whether a photoplay is a "dramatic work" within the meaning of section 1(d) of the Copyright Act. It
held that it was. It then determined that the whole picture need not be
copied to constitute infringement,
adding: "The mere copying of a major
50
sufficient."
is
sequence
The problem of originality, although not very significant in the determination of the case, was also discussed. The court, applying the concept
already alluded to that the law protects originality in the means of expression, said:
"In answer to the point that the sequence lifted is commonplace, we
find no evidence that they had ever previously appeared in like combination,
arrangement or form. The direct examination of Bruckman supports this
ruling. The originality was displayed in taking commonplace materials and
acts and making them into a new combination and novel arrangement which

is protectible by copyright. ...
"The means of expressing an idea is subject to copyright protection,
and where one uses his own method or way of expressing his idea, such
adornment constitutes a protectible work. It is true that the mere motions,
voice and postures of actors and mere stage business is not subject of copyright protection, but the sequence in question has literary quality in that
it contains a story and is dramatic composition." 5'

"9Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945). See, Funkiouser v.

Loew's, Inc., 208 F.2d 185, 189 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d
99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Ricker v. General Electric Co., 162 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Dorsey
v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir. 1938) ; Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer,
65 F.2d 1, 24 (9th Cir. 1933) ; Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131, 135-136 (8th
Cir. 1932). See, Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 482
(1951). The latest high judicial declaration on the subject is in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
217,218 (1954).
'0
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
" Id. at 363. See Mazer v. Stein, supra note 49.
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The converse of the principle, i.e., that similarity of incidents does not
necessarily spell copying was treated in another case. A. C. Witwer had
copyrighted an original story entitled "The Emancipation of Rodney." In
an action brought by the administratrix of his estate, Sadie Witwer, the
trial court found infringement, issued an injunction against the production
of the play and ordered an accounting to determine the profits. The judgment
was reversed, the court ruling that there was no similarity between the two
plots and that whatever apparent similarity existed, was fortuitous and inherent in the situations with which both works dealt:
"We are of opinion that such similarities as exist between the play and
the story, and there are many, are such as require analysis and critical
comparison in order to manifest themselves. The outstanding feature, the
climax of both story and play, is the football game, with necessarily some
similarity, but there is nothing new and novel in that other than the unusual
participation of the heroes in their respective games, and on analysis these
are neither identical nor similar in scene nor in conception of the two productions, but, if this be doubted, as was done by the trial court, then it is clear
that there is no such similarity as overcomes the positive testimony that there
was in fact no copying. The circumstantial evidence derived from comparison
of the two productions is not forceful or weighty enough to overcome the
direct and positive and persuasive evidence to the contrary offered by the
plaintiff herself. 'Unless the public is deceived by the pictures, and led
to believe that the films are a picturization of plaintiff's literary work (the
standard of the ordinary observer being applied) then no infringement ' is
shown.' Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios (D.C.), 18 F. (2d) 126, 128."52
The "ordinary observer" test for determining presence or absence of
similarity has been reaffirmed by the same court repeatedly.53 I applied

it in holding that there was no similarity in the manner of using a church
as a scene for action between the motion picture "When Tomorrow Comes"
and James M. Cain's copyrighted novel "Serenade."
"Was there what the cases call 'unconscious and unintentional copying?'
.. .If we apply the only permissible test-similarity-as it is manifest to the
ordinary reader of the book and observer of the picture, the sole and obvious
answer must be negative.
"One need not deny originality to 'Serenade.' . . . Plaintiff, himself,
concedes as much when he limits the alleged infringement to the church
sequence. But, here, again, there is no similarity. . . .It suffices to say that

it is inconceivable that the ordinary theater-goer, who saw the chaste, idyllic
church sequence in 'When Tomorrow Comes,' of the two lovers who spent
the night in the church choir loft, where they sought asylum from the
storm, would see in it, in the manner of its development or in the means
used to portray the period between their entry into the church to their rescue,
2 Harold

Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, supra note 49, at 28. For a more recent case in which no

copying of any important sequence was found, see Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 49, at 188.
5
Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 49.
"
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any similarity between it and the sensuous scene which Cain portrays in

'Serenade.' I can see none ...
"It is not claimed that the choice of the church as a refuge in storm
lends itself to the assertion of copyrightable originality. Houses of worship

have been asylums since their very beginning. At one time, the legal privilege
of sanctuary attached to churches. And he who entered one of them acquired
immunity against the law.
"The other small details, on which stress is laid, such as the playing of
the piano, the prayer, the hunger motive, as it is called, are inherent in the
situation itself. They are what the French call 'scenes i faire.' One having
placed two persons in a church during a big storm, it was inevitable that
incidents like these and others which are, necessarily, associated with such'54a
situation should force themselves upon the writer in developing the theme."
The cases just discussed used a pattern for determining originality and
testing infringement which is universally accepted. " They have been applied
consistently through the circuit, to a great variety of intellectual products,
some of which rank rather low in artistic, literary or dramatic value. Illus-

trative are: decorative design,"6 directories,5 7 distinctive title or distinctive
human type,5 8 maps, 59 musical compositions," ° photographs, 6 plays and
stories, 2 and poems. 3 But originality and therefore copyrightability have
"' Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (S.D. Cal. 1942). See also De Montijo
v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 40 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Seltzer v. Sunbrock,
22 F. Supp. 621, 628 (S.D. Cal. 1938). It was decided in a case involving a similar problem that
the use of the Hollywood Bowl as the locale for a story was not the subject of a claim of
proprietorship, James v. Universal Pictures Corp. (Cal. Superior Court), Los Angeles Journal,
Dec. 8, 1928. And see Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945) for an
extended treatment of this topic.
'

50

See note 49 supra.

Malsed v. Marshall Field & Co., 96 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. Wash. 1951).
5'
Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
58
Warner Brothers Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 102 F. Supp. 141 (S.D. Cal.
1951) ; Paramore v. Mack Sennett, Inc., 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Cal. 1925). But see Chamberlain v.
Columbia Pictures, 185 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1951), where the court declined to enjoin the association
of Mark Twain's name with a story in the public domain.
" Christianson v. West Publishing Co., 53 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Cal. 1944) ; Blackburn v. South.
era California Gas Co., 14 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Chamberlin v. Bekins Van & Storage
Co., 23 F. 2d 541 (S.D. Cal. 1928).
'o Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 Fed.
749 (9th Cir. 1918); Carew v. R.K.O., 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Hirsch v. Paramount
Pictures, 17 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. CaL 1937); Buck v. Milam, 32 F. 2d 622 (D.C. Idaho 1929);
Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co. v. Tollefson, 253 Fed. 859 (S.D. Cal. 1918) ; Broder v. Zeno Mauvais
Music Co., 88 Fed. 74 (N.D. Cal. 1898); Rich v. Paramount Pictures, 130 Cal.App.2d 775,
279 P.2d 782 (1955) ; Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.Pat.Q. 137 (Superior Ct. Los Angeles County 1949).
Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., supra, is interesting in holding that "indecent" words in a
song make it uncopyrightable. The subject of immorality in copyrighted material is also treated
in Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., supra note 54. See Ted Fair, Publication of Immoral and
Indecent Works, 5th Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP), 1954, p. 230. And see Supreme Records
v. Decca, 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950), for a discussion of the rights to musical arrangement.
For comment, see, Netterville, CaliforniaLaw of Unfair Competition, 28 So. CALn. L. Rv. 241,
278-279
(1944).
6
Journal Publishing Co. v. Drake, 199 Fed. 572 (9th Cir. 1912).
2
Hazard v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 150 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Stonesifer v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 48 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Cal. 1942) ; Barbadillo v. Goldwyn, 42 F.2d 881 (S.D. Cal. 1930).
" Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941). In this case it was
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been denied to books rebound and sold, 4 description of a spectacle or game, 5
stories describing wild horses,6 6 claim of copyright to "spirit" messages
received by prior author of book now dead,6 7 claim to exclusive use of
historical event,6" advertising slogans using ordinary descriptive words.6 9
B. Criminal Prosecution for Copyright Infringement.
An interesting aspect of the problem is the fact that in one of the rare

prosecutions under the penal provisions of the Copyright Act,7" in which
Groucho and Chico Marx were convicted of infringing and aiding the
infringement of a copyrighted production, the Court not only sustained the
constitutionality of the criminal provision-which, although a part of the
law for many years, has not been used very often-but also applied to the
facts in the case the rule of similarity applicable in civil actions for infringement:
"It is urged that there was a fatal variance between the copyrighted
work charged to have been pirated and the version of it which was in fact
shown to have been broadcast.
"There was no substantial variance. The basic situation in the copyrighted material and in the script broadcast was the same. The development
of the idea and the manner of expression were not only markedly similar, but
were in many respects substantially identical. The law is well established
that where the labors of an author are substantially and injuriously appropriated by another, an infringement occurs. Dymow v. Bolton, 2 Cir., 11
F.2d 690.
"Such variance as existed did not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The indictment definitely informed them of the charge and of the time and
circumstances of the claimed infringement. They were in no way misled in
the preparation of their defense. Nor is the variance such as to deprive
accused of protection against another prosecution for the same offense.""'

C. Infringement by Parody.
Judge James M. Carter, of the 9th Circuit, in an action instituted by
Loew's, Inc. against Columbia Broadcasting System, American Tobacco
held that the production of the words of a poem in combination with music was not a dramatization of the poem and did not infringe the author's copyright.
" Bureau of National Literature v. Sells, 211 Fed. 379 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
" Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal. 1938) ; Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 Fed. Cas.
920 (Cal. 1867). See, Maddux v. Grey, 43 F.2d 441 (S.D. Cal. 1930), denying infringement in a
novel of a description of a buffalo hunt, claimed to have been contained in an autobiographical
book; Taylor v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Cal. 1953), denying proprietary rights in a particular arrangement of cameras and lights, producing certain specific effects;
Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1939), denying originality to the description of a
pension plan.
" Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F. 2d 126 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
" Oliver v. St. Germain Foundation, 41 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
" De Montijo v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 40 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Cal. 1941);
Echevarria v. Warner Brothers, 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
" Laskowitz v. Marie Designer, 119 F. Supp. 541, 552 (S.D. Cal. 1954). See Simms v. Stanton,
75 Fed. 6 (N.D. Cal. 1896), upholding as "fair use" the copying of certain material in a book on
physiognomy drawn from a common source.
"17 U.S.C. § 28 (1946), now 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1947).
"Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1938).
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Company and the well-known comedian, Jack Benny, recently enjoined the
performance of a humorous sketch, "Auto Lite," burlesquing the motion

picture "Gas Light," the property of Loew's.7"
The problem of burlesquing and parody has been treated fully by the
writer elsewhere.7" However, the following observations may be made on
the case just referred to.

While the conclusion reached can be justified on the basis of the facts
presented, there is ground for disagreement with the theory to which the
opinion gives assent, namely, that in order to determine plagiarism, parody

or burlesque should be judged in the same manner as actual or serious taking.
For, under a rigid application of this criterion-measured by the rule of
substantial taking-parody or burlesque would almost always infringe.
Under the law of actual taking, the appropriation of even two or three scenes

constitutes infringement. 4 If this test were applied, it would, in many
instances, deny altogether the application of the doctrine of fair use to parody
or burlesque. In other cases, it would contract the concept unjustifiably.
Parody or burlesque, viewed in their historical perspective, do not justify

this approach which might result in denying to it the status of a distinct

literary genre, which it has had in the Anglo-American world of letters,
both before and after the enactment of the copyright Statute of Anne in 1710.

But to return to the general topic. One fact is significant-the courts
consider the determination of the question of originality and infringement
as a question of fact, 5 as to which, in proper cases, a jury trial should be
had. 7" Summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings will be sustained

only where the copyrighted work and the infringing work are both before
the court and the only question is similarity.77

D. Rights and Duties.
Novel questions have arisen as to the nature of the right conferred by
copyright and the transfer of such right. Some years ago we were asked
to determine what constituted a "general publication" of a manuscript.

Under the same facts, the Court of Appeals and I reached opposite conclu" Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 105 U.S.Pat.Q. 304 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
" Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, CAN. B. REV. (Dec. 1955);
Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHIL L. REv. 203; Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright,
6th Copyright Law Symposium, 1955, pp. 43, 54-57.
"' Helm v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 1946); Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 468-469- (2d Cir. 1946); Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 1941);
Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 Fed. 864, 865-866 (2d Cir. 1914) ; Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 244, 337339 (1950).
7' Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 99 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1938).
'o Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946).
"Christianson v. West Publishing Co., 149 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Piantadosi v. Loew's, Inc.,
137 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1943). See note 13 supra, for comment on California statutory provision
(CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PRo. § 426(3)) which facilitates determination by comparison without trial.
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sions. I held that a publication of a manuscript dealing with philosophical
ideas limited to a few adherents of the philosophy did not constitute a general
publication.7 The Court of Appeals, upon the same facts, reached a contrary
conclusion."
As the right conferred by the copyright statute is federal in nature,
do the federal courts have the right to entertain proceedings to foreclose
a mortgage on the copyright? I held that they did."0 In view of the fact that
the copyright statute specifically authorizes chattel mortgages on copyrights, 8 '
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in interpreting the section,
held that copyrights can be mortgaged only under the federal copyright law. 2
But our own Court of Appeals held that foreclosures must be had in the
state courts.8 3
Vexing problems relating to the transfer of rights to copyrighted
material have arisen. Our courts have held that an assignment of all rights
in a story to a motion picture concern does not imply a warranty of marketable title.8 4 But the grant by an artist to his producer of the right to his
services for motion picture purposes, including the right to photograph and
reproduce "his acts, poses, plays or appearances," carries the right to
exercise the ". . . ownership and rights to the product of artist's employment whether or not such exercise involves exhibition of the subject motion
pictures in connection with commercial advertising."8 5 And the same words
in the contract of another motion picture artist were held not to prohibit
the producer from cutting the performances to a shorter length and "showing
them in connection with commercial advertising over television."8 "
S8White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952).
'0 Republic Pictures v. Security First National Bank, 97 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
8- 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1947).
"2In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 Fed. 886 (2d Cir. 1921). California state courts have held that
a patent right, being incorporeal in nature, is not subject to execution under state law. Peterson v.
Sheriff of San Francisco, 115 Cal. 211, 46 Pac. 1060 (1896) ; Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520;
40 Am. Rep. 120 (1881).
"2Republic Pictures v. Security First National Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1952).
" Loew's, Inc. v. Wolff, 101 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affirmed on basis of this opinion
in Loew's, Inc. v. Wolff, 215 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1951).
" Rogers v. Republic Productions, 213 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1954). See note 19 supra. See
also Wexley v. KTTV, 108 F. Supp. 558 (S.D. Cal. 1952), in which a grant of rights to a dramatic
composition including all motion picture rights was held to convey the right to televise the motion
picture. The rule was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the court stating its agreement with the
opinion and its reasoning, Wexley v. KTTV, 220 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1955).
" Autry v. Republic Pictures, 104 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1952), affirmed in Autry v. Republic
Pictures, 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954). This case is in line with others in which the words in
contracts have been given broad interpretations to cover contingencies which may not have existed
at the time, but could clearly have been anticipated. Thus, the transfer of motion picture rights
was held to include the right to produce talking pictures, Murphy v. Warner Brothers, 112 F.2d
746 (9th Cir. 1940). See note 19 supra. In United Artists Corp. v. Strand Productions, 216 F.2d
305 (9th Cir. 1954), a contract between a distributor and a producer regarding distribution was
interpreted to grant the right to exploit motion picture films in the television field, either directly
or through others. As to the federal nature of radio broadcasting as it bears on the right to tax
locally, see McCaw v. Fase, 216 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1954).

Feb. 1956]

LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CREATIVE ARTS

139

IV. Personal Relationships
In treating state law, we discussed the attitude of courts towards the

relationship of master and servant as expressed both in the legislation and
jurisprudence of the state courts. A most interesting problem has arisen
with what is commonly known as the "morality clause" in motion picture
contracts. For years-and at a time when motion picture producers were
concerned not with the political but with other extra-curricular social activities of artists which might reflect on them and their product-there has been
inserted into the contracts of employment of actors and writers a clause
which reads substantially as follows:
"The employee agrees to conduct himself with due regard to public
conventions and morals and agrees that he will not do or commit any act
or thing that will tend to degrade him in society or bring him into public
hatred, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or that will tend to shock, insult or offend
the community or ridicule public morals or decency, or prejudice the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio industry in general."
Lester Cole, a writer for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, was discharged on
December 2, 1947, by notice which stated, in substance, that by his conduct
during his appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee
on October 30, 1947, he had violated this clause. He brought action for
declaratory judgment, which was tried before a jury. The chief interrogatories
submited to the Jury and their answers were:
"(1) Did the plaintiff Lester Cole, by his statements and conduct before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in connection with the
hearing held by said Committee, bring himself or tend to bring himself into
public hatred, contempt, scorn and ridicule?
"Answer: No.
"(2) Did the plaintiff Lester Cole, by his statements and conduct before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in connection with the
hearing held by said Committee, tend to shock, insult or offend the community?
"Answer: No.
"(3) Did the plaintiff Lester Cole, by his statements and conduct before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities in connection with the hearing held by said Committee, prejudice the defendant Loew's Incorporated
as his employer or the motion picture industry generally?
"Answer: No.
"(4) Did the defendant Loew's Incorporated by its conduct towards
the plaintiff, subsequent to the hearing, waive the right to take action against
him by suspending him?
"Answer: Yes."
On the basis of these special verdicts and because I agreed with them,
I gave judgment in favor of Cole for the salary due him during the period
of his wrongful discharge. The opinion which was delivered at the time
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and the Findings which followed stated that the "morality clause" had not
been violated, and that the company by their actions-by continuing Cole
in their employ after his appearance before the congressional committee
and, especially, by increasing his salary and discussing with him new
assignments-had countenanced and condoned his conduct and thus waived
the breach. 7
The Court of Appeals disagreed. They held that the effect of Cole's
conduct on public opinion should have been gone into more fully and that
the acts of the employers were not a waiver, saying:
"We think that it cannot be said as a matter of law that these facts,
uncontroverted as they are, establish either that there was a practical construction of the contract as having the meaning appellee says should be
attached to it, or that there had been a waiver of performance in advance.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 297."8s
These questions came again before the Court of Appeals in 1954 upon
a judgment rendered in favor of another writer, Ring Lardner, another one
of "the Hollywood Ten," who, in 1947, had declined to answer questions of
the House Un-American Activities Committee. This was an action for damages tried by another judge before a jury. Here, again, the jury rendered
a verdict in favor of the writer. Lardner's contract contained a similar
morality clause which the Court of Appeals characterized as containing:
"everything that Cole's said and a little more."8 9 Again the court ruled
that the acceptance of performance by the company for a short period of
time did not amount to a waiver and that informal statements by some of the
men in authprity as to Lardner's continuance of performance of the contract
lacked authorization.
A reading of the two opinions leaves the definite impression that the
effect of the conduct before the House Un-American Activities Committee
which, in 1950, was considered in the Cole case a question of fact, became
almost a legal presumption in the Lardner case in 1954. Acts done in 1947
relating to so sensitive a subject as suspected Communism or Communist
activities, are difficult to evaluate in the climate of later years. Nevertheless,
it should be observed that both cases were tried before juries, and identical
decisions were reached. The atmosphere of tension existing at the time the
cases were decided by the Court of Appeals did not exist when the incidents
occurred or when the cases were tried. One wonders if this did not affect final
determination. Revealing is the fact that early in 1955, the Supreme Court
of California refused to give effect to an award of damages by an Arbitration
Board made in favor of a woman employee for wrongful discharge, under
an arbitration provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement,
8"

Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 508 (S.D. Cal. 1948).

8 Loew's, Inc., v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 652 (9th Cir. 1950).

" Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1954).
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upon the ground that the employee's membership in the Communist Party

justified her discharge by the employer-a laboratory which manufactured
and sold throughout the United States vaccines, serums, anti-toxins and other
antibiotics for both civilian and military use.9"
It is wise social policy to be alert against any totalitarian doctrines
subversive to our ideals. I have had occasion to express concern over the
matter.9 1 And more recently, I ruled that concealment of membership in the
Communist Party was a fraud on the government under the Naturalization

and Immigration Act of 1940.92 One wonders if we are right in reading these
anxieties into private contracts of employment in order to justify breaches

of contracts of employment which create in private employment a caste of
pariahs to whom we, in effect, deny the equal protection of our laws.9"
Conclusion
On the whole, it must be said that the West, both legislatively and
juristically (and as to the latter, both through state and federal courts),
has approached the problems created by the transfer of activities in certain
areas of artistic endeavor intelligently. They have applied with noted
acumen old principles to new conditions and have sought to evolve new
principles where the old ones were found inadequate. In all these matters,
there was an attempt to attain feasible goals and to conform to the, spirit
of growth which is characteristic of American law and to that spirit of
moderation, equity and fair play which is a tradition of our American life.
If the endeavor has not always been successful and the end product not
always wise, the fault lies in the fact that the instrumentalities with which
these results were achieved-be they legislators, or judges-are human and
subject to the actions, and, implicitly, the frailties, passions and prejudices
of the society, and the times, in which they live. Absolute detachment is not
"oBlack v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal.2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S.
816 (1955).
11YANKWicH, THE CONSTrrIUTION AND THE FTRE:, 20-23 (1935); YANKWICH, NATURE OF
OUR FREEDOM, 81 et seq. (1950).

" United States v. Title, 132 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
"'The trend of recent judicial opinion makes this warning very timely. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has held that "screen credit" whereby there is indicated on a motion picture
the name of the author of the script is a valuable contractual right, the denial of which by a
producer warrants a substantial award of damages. Paramount Productions v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863
(9th Cir. 1937). Nevertheless, California courts have held that the failure of a writer to deny
charges before a House Committee on Un-American Activities attacking him as a communist warranted denial to the writer of screen credit by the producer. R.K.O. v. Jarico, 128 Cal.App.2d 172,
274 P.2d 928 (1954). One of the superior courts of California has ruled that such refusal warranted
the producers in establishing a "blacklist" by declining to hire, and inducing others not to hire
persons who either refused to testify at all or claimed the constitutional immunity against selfincrimination. The complaint, which was dismissed, sought redress for malicious interference with
"economic relations" affecting "the fundamental right to work for a living," Brown v. Loew's, Inc.,
Los Angeles Daily Journal Reports, VoL 5, No. 9, p. 282 .
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always humanly attainable. A wise and realistic English Judge wrote in
1769:
"It is wise in any state, to encourage letters, and the painful researches
of learned men. The easiest and most equal way of doing it is by securing
to them the property of their own works. Nobody contributes, who is not
willing; and though a good book may be run down, and a bad one cried up,
for a time; yet sooner or later, the reward will be in proportion to the merit
of the work.
"A writer's fame will not be the less, that he has bread, without being
' 94
under the necessity of prostituting his pen to flattery or party, to get it.

So it may be said that, while the law makers of the West may have
impressed their judgments with some of the prejudices of the day, on the
whole, and especially in protecting the property rights of creators engaged
in intellectual activities, they have struck a wise balance between the desire
to reward materially those exercising the creative spirit and the primary
constitutional aim to insure to our society the great advantage which flows
from the encouragement of the arts and sciences.9 5

" Mr. Justice Willes in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2335, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 201, 218 (1769).

" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See also, Ballentine v. De Sylva, 266 F.2d 623
(9th Cir. 1955), indicating the attempt of the court to envisage in a forthright manner the odd
realities which human relationships, stemming from copyright, bring to their attention. The court
was confronted with two problems. The first was whether, under 17 U.S.C.A. § 24, the widow of
an author is in a class with a child so far as the rights of renewal and extension of copyright is
concerned. As to this, the court reached the conclusion that the rights of the widow and the
children are expressed in the alternative-which means that either one or the other "may act for
the family which consists of the widow or widower and all of the children." In this respect, the
conclusion reached is rather restrictive. However, the other question submitted solved it in a very
humane manner. The court had before it the assertion of the right to renew or extend a copyright
on behalf of the illegitimate child of a writer, who had been acknowledged as his during his
lifetime, but had never been legitimatized under California law. Disregarding the harsh attitude
towards illegitimacy of the common law, and the older cases which interpret the word "child"
when used in instruments relating to the conveyance or descent of property, to mean a "legitimate"
child, the court held that the word "child" in the section referred to would apply to an illegitimate
child. In this manner, the right to renew and extend the copyright was granted to an illegitimate
child, thus preventing the copyrighted song from falling into the public domain.

